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Empirical Research Paper
For both personal and social reasons, people may be unwill-
ing to report prejudices toward different social groups. Even 
when willing, people may be unaware of their biases and, 
therefore, unable to report them (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995). Implicit measures of intergroup bias were 
developed to address these shortcomings by measuring bias 
without asking respondents to directly report them (Banaji & 
Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Such bias1 
has turned out to be pervasive, and predictive of stereotyping 
behavior. For example, large samples of data taken from 
project implicit show that pro-White/anti-Black bias is com-
mon, with an average effect size of d = .80 (Lane, Banaji, 
Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). In addition, implicitly mea-
sured race bias is correlated with meaningful behaviors, such 
as racial disparities in police shooting, β = .39 (Hehman, 
Flake, & Calanchini, 2017). Given its potential for adversely 
affecting behavior and outcomes, it is not surprising that 
researchers have taken a keen interest in understanding how 
such biases may be reduced. As such, in recent years, many 
interventions have been developed to decrease implicit bias 
(however, they may be short-lived; Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Gaertner, 2000; Lai et al., 2014).
Many bias interventions directly target beliefs about a group. 
For example, one strategy is to ask participants to vividly 
imagine a counter-stereotypic scenario in which a Black 
individual behaves more positively than a White individual 
(Foroni & Mayr, 2005; Lai et al., 2014). Another approach is 
to directly present participants with counter-stereotypic 
Black and White exemplars (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; 
Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010; Lai et al., 2014). The goal of these 
interventions is to either change the accessibility of different 
aspects of group knowledge or to directly alter, if only tem-
porarily, the extent to which different attributes are associ-
ated with social groups. They are attempts to change the 
underlying mental representations that produce bias.
In contrast to interventions that focus on changing under-
lying beliefs about a group, other interventions attempt to 
reduce bias by providing people with strategies for how to 
respond without bias while completing the implicit measure 
(e.g., Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Lai et al., 2014). Perhaps the 
most promising of these interventions is to equip people with 
“implementation intentions” that offer concrete behavioral 
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Abstract
Research has found that implementation intentions, if–then action plans (e.g., “if I see a Black face, I will think safe”), reduce 
stereotyping on implicit measures. However, it is unknown by what process(es) implementation intentions reduce implicit 
stereotyping. The present research examines the effects of implementation intentions on stereotype activation (e.g., extent 
to which stereotypic information is accessible) and stereotype application (e.g., extent to which accessible stereotypes are 
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four studies, implementation intentions reduced implicit stereotyping. This decrease in stereotyping was associated with 
reductions in both stereotype activation and application. In addition, these effects of implementation intentions were highly 
efficient and associated with reduced stereotyping even for groups for which people may have little practice inhibiting 
stereotypes (e.g., gender).
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plans for avoiding the expression of bias (Lai et al., 2014; 
Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010; Stewart & Payne, 
2008). Implementation intentions are if–then action plans in 
which individuals form an association between a cue (the 
“if”) and a desired behavior (the “then”). Implementation 
intentions have been used successfully to change both 
thoughts and behavior in several domains, including aca-
demic achievement, dieting, and many others (Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). For example, if one wanted to think of Black 
people as less threatening, one could form an implementa-
tion intention: “If I see a Black person, I will think safe.” 
Because the cue (a Black person) and the behavior (thinking 
safe) are associated and planned in advance, the behavior is 
more likely to occur than if an individual merely forms gen-
eral intentions to think of Black individuals as safe 
(Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001). As a result 
of forming such implementation intentions, the mere pre-
sentation of a cue (a Black person) can automatically facili-
tate the desired behavior (thinking safe). For example, 
Stewart and Payne (2008) found that participants who 
formed implementation intentions to think “safe” whenever 
they saw a Black face during the Weapon Identification Task 
(Payne, 2001) were less influenced by racial stereotypes 
compared to a control condition. Similarly, Mendoza et al. 
(2010) found that implementation intentions to ignore race 
decreased racial bias on the First-Person Shooter Task 
(Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Thus, imple-
mentation intentions have been shown to successfully 
reduce implicit intergroup bias and may even be able to do 
so for longer periods of time than other interventions (up to 
3 weeks; Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2012).
Given the promise of implementation intentions as an 
effective and lasting intervention to reduce implicit bias, it 
is vital to understand the mechanisms underlying such 
effects. To the extent that these mechanisms are understood, 
aspects of the intervention can be fine-tuned to maximize 
its effectiveness. Moreover, such knowledge may permit 
the development of new interventions that target the same 
mechanisms. Toward this end, researchers have attempted 
to delineate the components of implicit bias that are affected 
by implementation intentions. Although implicit bias is 
often described as reflecting only unintentional or auto-
matic responses, there is now considerable evidence that 
intentional processes contribute substantially to the extent 
of implicit bias (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, 
& Groom, 2005; Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012; Payne, 
2001). Stewart and Payne (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2010) 
used the process dissociation technique (e.g., Payne, 2001) 
to assess the extent to which implementation intentions 
affect intentional versus unintentional components of 
implicit bias. Whereas Stewart and Payne (2008) found that 
implementation intentions reduced unintended but not 
intended components of bias, Mendoza et al. (2010) found 
evidence that both unintentional and intentional processes 
were affected.
Although process dissociation separates the influence of 
intentional versus unintentional processes, it does not iden-
tify the contributions of specific cognitive mechanisms by 
which implementation intentions may induce their effects. 
Of particular interest is the extent to which implementation 
intentions reduce implicit bias by reducing the extent to 
which stereotypes are activated in memory (stereotype acti-
vation) versus reducing the extent to which activated stereo-
types are applied during judgment processes (stereotype 
application; Devine & Monteith, 1999; Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Theoretically, stereotype 
activation must precede stereotype application. Unless ste-
reotypes are activated in the first place, there is no stereotype 
to apply or correct against. In part, because stereotype appli-
cation comes later in the temporal sequence, most models of 
stereotyping assume that stereotype application is easier to 
control than is stereotype activation. That is, with stereotype 
application occurring later in the sequence, there is greater 
opportunity to impose one’s intentions on stereotype applica-
tion than activation (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995). As such, if 
implementation intentions reduce stereotype application, but 
not activation, then any effects on reduced bias may be rela-
tively fragile. Specifically, if anything interferes with the 
ability to prevent application (e.g., limited cognitive 
resources; limited response time), then activated stereotypes 
will affect judgment and behavior. In contrast, if implemen-
tation intentions can reduce the initial activation of stereo-
types, then such effects would presumably be more robust 
against interference. If the stereotype is not activated in the 
first place, it will not be applied, even under conditions of 
limited resources or time (Devine & Monteith, 1999; Gilbert 
& Hixon, 1991; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Thus, for both 
theoretical and practical reasons, it is important to know 
whether implementation intentions reduce stereotype activa-
tion, stereotype application, or both.
The Current Research
The main goal of the current research was to test the extent to 
which implementation intentions influence stereotype activa-
tion and stereotype application. Specifically, we test whether 
implementation intentions formed to respond without bias do 
so by decreasing stereotype activation or stereotype applica-
tion. The second goal of this research was to examine the 
extent to which these effects of implementation intentions 
depend on the availability of cognitive resources. We know 
that implementation intentions effectively reduce racial bias 
on implicit measures. This alone suggests that implementa-
tion intentions may operate relatively efficiently. Nevertheless, 
implementation intentions are an intentional strategy for 
reducing racial bias. Intentionality is thought to be affected by 
the extent to which individuals have access to cognitive 
resources. As such, it is possible that implementation intentions 
require sufficient cognitive resources to affect implicit bias 
(Conrey et al., 2005; Govorun & Payne, 2006). This would 
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set an important constraint on the contexts in which imple-
mentation intentions might be expected to be effective inter-
ventions. Thus, for the first time, we directly investigate the 
extent to which implementation intentions depend on cogni-
tive resources to reduce implicit bias and the processes that 
contribute to bias (i.e., activation and application).
A related question concerns the role of experience or 
practice in inhibiting stereotypes. To the extent that people 
have practiced inhibiting the expression of a stereotype, the 
process should become relatively routinized and automatic. 
We explore this issue by examining the effects of implemen-
tation intentions on stereotypes that our participants attempt 
to inhibit more (race) or less (gender) frequently. In particu-
lar, among our college-aged participants, social norms often 
encourage inhibition of stereotypes of Black men as threat-
ening. In contrast, there are no social norms dictating that 
men should not be judged as more threatening than women. 
As such, our participants should be more practiced at inhibit-
ing race than gender stereotypes surrounding threat. If the 
effects of implementation intentions are restricted to highly 
practiced stereotype inhibition (see Moskowitz & Li, 2011 
for data consistent with this possibility), this would suggest 
an important constraint on their effectiveness. In contrast, if 
implementation intentions are effective even with stereo-
types that are not typically inhibited, then this would indicate 
that the strategy is broadly applicable for bias reduction.
Measuring Stereotype Activation and Application
To investigate the mechanisms by which implementation 
intentions work to reduce implicit racial bias, we examine 
their effects on performance on the stereotype misperception 
task (SMT; Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). The SMT was 
developed, specifically, to measure both stereotype activa-
tion and application during performance of a single task. It is 
the only existing means to measure these processes simulta-
neously and independently. Typically, stereotype activation 
and application are measured via performance on different 
measures (for a review, see Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). 
Stereotype activation is most often measured via some form 
of priming measure that is presumed to provide an implicit 
and relatively pure assessment of the extent to which knowl-
edge has been activated in memory. In contrast, stereotype 
application is most often measured via performance on some 
judgment task, in which participants provide explicit judg-
ments of a target based on different arrays of information. 
The underlying logic of this approach is that performance on 
measures of activation reflects only the extent of activation 
and not other stereotyping processes. In contrast, perfor-
mance on measures of application have been presumed to 
reflect primarily intentional judgment processes that are 
engaged after stereotypes become active (e.g., whether to 
apply the stereotype or not). However, there is now extensive 
evidence that performance on measures of stereotype activa-
tion is influenced by intentional processes. In other words, 
measures of stereotype activation and application are not 
pure measures of the intended processes but, rather, reflect 
the influence of multiple processes (e.g., Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012; Payne, 2001).
More broadly, there is always the risk when using differ-
ent tasks to measure different processes that any observed 
differences in performance may reflect specific procedural 
features of the measures rather than differences in the pro-
cesses of interest (e.g., “structural fit”). Thus, when using 
priming versus judgment tasks to measure stereotype activa-
tion and application, respectively, it is always possible that 
any observed differences reflect a myriad of method-related 
processes that differ between the tasks, rather than differ-
ences in the extents of activation and application. Therefore, 
if one wants to test and compare the effects of a manipula-
tion, such as implementation intentions, on two different pro-
cesses (e.g., stereotype activation vs. stereotype application), 
it is desirable to keep the procedural features of the measures 
constant. One solution to this problem is to use a single task 
that reflects the joint contributions of both processes and 
apply modeling techniques (described below) to disentangle 
the processes of interest (for a review, see Sherman, Klauer, 
& Allen, 2010). The SMT was designed, specifically, to mea-
sure the extents of stereotype activation and application sep-
arately and independently from performance on a single task, 
thereby controlling for any method variance in the measure-
ment of the processes. The ability of the SMT to accomplish 
this goal has been confirmed through careful validation stud-
ies (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012).
Overview
In Experiment 1, we examine whether implementation inten-
tions reduce stereotyping on the SMT, and the processes by 
which they do so. Specifically, we examine the extent to 
which implementation intentions reduce bias by influencing 
stereotype activation and application. In Experiment 2, we 
also investigate the efficiency with which implementation 
intentions operate by directly replicating Experiment 1 while 
manipulating the cognitive resources available to respon-
dents. In Experiment 3, we further examine the efficiency of 
implementation intentions by reducing cognitive resources by 
manipulating the time participants have to make judgments. 
Finally, in Experiment 4, we examine whether the effective-
ness and efficiency of implementation intentions extends to a 
stereotype that people are unlikely to regularly inhibit: the 
stereotype that men are more threatening than women. This 
provides further insight into the efficiency, robustness, and 
generality of implementation intention effects.
Experiment 1
Method
Preregistration. We preregistered each experiment in the cur-
rent paper on the Open Science Framework (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012; all preregistration materials available at 
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https://osf.io/vhyex/). Preregistration plans included a priori 
power analyses and the minimum number of participants we 
sought to sample. The plan also included exclusion criteria, 
including excluding data from (a) participants making the 
same judgment on all SMT trials, (b) participants making the 
same judgment at a rate ±3 SD from their group, and (c) par-
ticipants incorrectly reporting their condition assignment in a 
post-experiment manipulation check. We note for each 
experiment the number of participants excluded for these cri-
teria. In addition, data were not analyzed at any intermediate 
point prior to obtaining the final sample in each experiment. 
We report all measures and conditions.
Participants. We planned to collect data from at least 123 par-
ticipants, providing 1 − β = .80 power, given the effect size 
(η
p
2 = .09) reported in Stewart and Payne (2008). In total, 
237 participants from the University of California, Davis 
completed the experiment for partial course credit (providing 
greater than .95 power). In Experiment 1, eight participants 
made the same judgment on all trials and an additional 19 
failed to report their condition assignment.2 Finally, research 
assistants identified two additional cases of strange behavior 
during the experiment (i.e., falling asleep, not attending to 
the task).3 The final sample consisted of 210 participants 
across three between-subjects conditions (“safe” N = 83, 
“accurate” N = 63, “quick” N = 64).
Stimuli. Prime stimuli were photographs of 24 Black and 24 
White males that were cropped at the neck (adapted from 
Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). In addi-
tion to the racial stimuli, we also included a neutral prime 
image that consisted of a facial outline of the same shape and 
size as the other photographs (see Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 
2012). All prime stimuli were superimposed on a gray back-
ground (see Figure 1).
Target stimuli were 48 computer-generated facial morphs 
developed by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) that were 
degraded using a pixelation filter in Adobe Photoshop (see 
Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). These stimuli were made 
from 24 unique identity faces that objectively varied in 
threat. That is, each unique identity had an associated face 
that was two standard deviations above (high threat) or below 
(low threat) a neutral point of threat ratings.
Procedure
SMT. Participants completed the experiment individu-
ally on computers in groups of 1 to 4. They learned that the 
task (SMT) tested their ability to form rapid impressions and 
were instructed to judge whether target faces were more or 
less threatening than the average target presented in the task. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible 
and to rely on their “gut” impressions in judging target faces. 
They were told to attend to prime faces for later questions but 
were also told that they should avoid responding to the prime 
faces when judging the computer-generated target faces. Par-
ticipants completed two blocks of six practice trials each to 
ensure that they understood the procedure (see Krieglmeyer 
& Sherman, 2012).
Participants then completed two test blocks of 72 trials 
each. Each test trial started with a fixation cross in the center 
of the screen for 500 ms, which was followed by a prime 
picture for 150 ms. After the prime picture, there was a blank 
Figure 1. Visual representation of the SMT Procedure.
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task.
Rees et al. 5
screen for 50 ms and then a target image for 100 ms. 
Following the target image presentation, a gray pattern mask 
was displayed until participants made a key press response 
(selecting either “more” or “less” threatening). A 500 ms 
intertrial interval followed each response. All prime types 
were paired equally with each target type. Stereotypic biases 
on the SMT are evident if participants judge a greater propor-
tion of targets as more threatening after Black than after 
White primes, despite explicit instructions to avoid being 
influenced by prime pictures.
Implementation intention instructions. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three implementation inten-
tion conditions, identical to those used in Stewart and Payne 
(2008). They were instructed to form implementation inten-
tions to think “Safe,” “Accurate,” or “Quick,” whenever 
they saw a Black face. After forming implementation inten-
tions, participants were reminded to rely on their immediate 
gut feelings to make their judgments but were additionally 
told, “from now on, be sure to think (safe/accurate/quick) 
when you see Black faces.” Following Stewart and Payne 
(2008), we expected the Accurate and Quick intention con-
ditions to act as control conditions compared to the criti-
cal Safe condition, which was expected to reduce the extent 
of bias. We did not expect meaningful differences between 
the Accurate and Quick conditions, but, given that we were 
adapting a manipulation from prior research, we opted to be 
cautious and run both of the control conditions reported in 
previous work.
Design. The experiment had a 3 (Intention: Safe vs. Accu-
rate vs. Quick) × 3 (Prime: Black vs. Neutral vs. White) × 2 
(Target: High threat vs. Low threat) mixed design. Imple-
mentation intentions were manipulated as a between-sub-
jects factor, whereas prime and target were within-subjects 
factors.
Results4
SMT effect. To test the effectiveness of implementation 
intentions on racial bias, we subjected the proportion of 
“more threatening” responses to a 3 (Implementation Inten-
tion: Accurate vs. Quick vs. Safe) × 3 (Prime: Black vs. Neu-
tral vs. White) × 2 (Target Threat: High vs. Low) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a main effect of 
target, F(1, 207) = 32.29, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14, such that high 
threat targets were given a greater proportion of threat judg-
ments than low threat targets (see Table 1). There was also a 
prime main effect, F(1.91, 395.14)5 = 7.90, p = .001, η
p
2 = .04. 
Simple comparisons showed that targets were judged as 
more threatening following Black primes compared to Neu-
tral primes, F(1, 209) = 6.07, p = .015, η
p
2 = .03, but not 
compared to White primes, F(1, 209) = .10, p = .758. More 
threat judgments were given after White primes compared to 
Neutral primes, F(1, 209) = 14.17, p < .001, η
p
2 = .06.6
As expected, implementation intentions moderated the 
prime effect, F(4, 414) = 16.91, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14 (see 
Figure 2). To better understand this interaction, we con-
ducted three separate repeated-measures ANOVAs on the 
proportion of “more threatening” responses to examine the 
prime effect within each intention condition.
A main effect of prime was evident in the Accurate 
condition, F(2, 124) = 9.18, p < .001, η
p
2 = .13. Simple com-
parisons indicated that a greater proportion of threat judg-
ments were made following Black primes than White primes, 
F(1, 62) = 7.89, p = .007, η
p
2 = .11, 95% CIdiff [.04, .22], and 
Neutral primes, F(1, 62) = 16.17, p < .001, η
p
2 = .21, 95% 
CIdiff [.10, .28]. In the Quick intention condition, there also 
was a prime main effect, F(1.85, 116.76) = 16.49, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .21. Simple comparisons showed that there was a 
higher proportion of threat judgments following Black 
primes than White primes, F(1, 63) = 12.08, p = .001, η
p
2 = .16, 
95% CIdiff [.06, .23], and Neutral primes, F(1, 63) = 27.70, 
Table 1. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) 
as a Function of Implementation Intention, Prime, and Target.
Experiment 1
 Black Neutral White
Accurate
 High threat .48 (.03) .31 (.04) .34 (.03)
 Low threat .44 (.03) .24 (.03) .33 (.03)
Quick
 High threat .50 (.03) .31 (.04) .34 (.03)
 Low threat .47 (.03) .23 (.03) .34 (.03)
Safe
 High threat .25 (.03) .42 (.03) .49 (.03)
 Low threat .23 (.03) .33 (.03) .46 (.03)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in 
column.
Figure 2. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
implementation intention and prime in Experiment 1.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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p < .001, η
p
2 = .31, 95% CIdiff [.13, .30]. There also was a 
greater proportion of threat judgments following White 
primes than Neutral primes, F(1, 63) = 5.12, p = .027, η
p
2 = .08, 
95% CIdiff [.01, .13]. These results indicate that racial bias 
was statistically detectable in both the Accurate and Quick 
conditions; participants more often judged targets as threat-
ening when following Black versus White primes.
In the Safe condition, there also was a prime effect, 
F(1.90, 152.71) = 15.68, p < .001, η
p
2 = .16. In contrast to the 
Accurate and Quick conditions, simple comparisons indicated 
that the proportion of threat judgments was lower for targets 
following Black primes than White primes, F(1, 82) = 28.27, 
p < .001, η
p
2 = .26, 95% CIdiff [−.32, −.15], and Neutral 
primes, F(1, 82) = 8.46, p = .005, η
p
2 = .09, 95% CIdiff 
[−.22, −.04]. Thus, the prime effect observed in the Accurate 
and Quick conditions was reversed in the Safe condition. The 
proportion of threat judgments was higher following White 
primes than Neutral primes, F(1, 82) = 8.22, p = .005, 
η
p
2 = .09, 95% CIdiff [.03, .17].
Multinomial modeling overview. To investigate the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for the effectiveness of implementa-
tion intentions on the SMT, we applied the SMT multinomial 
processing tree model. Multinomial models, such as the 
SMT model, attempt to describe experimental outcomes 
(e.g., proportion of threat judgments) via a set of variables 
(or parameters) and a set of equations that establish relation-
ships among the variables. The variables in the equations 
represent the hypothesized component processes (e.g., ste-
reotype activation; stereotype application). Solving for these 
variables yields independent estimates of the extent of each 
process. To achieve the measurement of distinct processes, 
parameter estimates are systematically varied through maxi-
mum likelihood estimation to determine the values that most 
closely reproduce actual task performance. Application of 
the SMT model allows us to measure the extent of stereotype 
activation and application separately and independently from 
performance on the SMT.
The SMT model estimates four parameters: stereotype 
activation, stereotype application, detection of target threat 
(D), and guessing tendencies (G). The SMT model describes 
how all of the four processes interact to produce responses 
on the SMT (see Figure 3). Racial primes activate stereo-
types with the probability (SAC) or fail to activate stereo-
types with the probability of (1 − SAC). If a stereotype is 
activated, it is applied with the probability (SAP) or is not 
Figure 3. Structure of the SMT multinomial processing tree.
Note. The top part shows the model for Black and White primes, and the bottom part shows the model for neutral primes. The table on the right depicts 
the responses as a function of prime and target. The response “more threat” is represented by a + sign and the response “less threat” is represented  
by a − sign. SAC = stereotype activation; 1 − SAC = lack of stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; 1 − SAP = stereotype correction;  
D = detection of target threat; 1 − D = detection of target trait; G = tendency to guess “more threat”; 1 − G = tendency to guess “less threat.”  
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; SMT = stereotype misperception task.
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applied in judgment with the probability of (1 − SAP). When 
stereotypes are activated and applied in judgment, partici-
pants render stereotype-congruent responses (e.g., selecting 
the “more threatening” response on trials with a Black 
prime). If stereotypes are activated but not applied, partici-
pants render stereotype-incongruent responses (e.g., select-
ing the “less threatening” response on trials with a Black 
prime). Validation of the SMT process model showed that 
modeling the absence of stereotype application as a process 
of contrast against activated stereotypes best accounted for 
experimental data (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). If ste-
reotypes are not activated (1 − SAC), participants may cor-
rectly detect (D) the threat level of the target (e.g., selecting 
the “more threatening” response on trials with a high threat 
target). However, if detection fails (1 − D), participants guess 
“more threatening” with the probability (G) or “less threaten-
ing” with the probability of (1 − G).
The four processes of the SMT model are estimated 
using the frequencies of “more threatening” and “less 
threatening” responses given for the different prime and 
target combinations. Each branch of the SMT model repre-
sents the joint influences of cognitive processes that lead to 
“more” and “less” responses. Probability estimates for the 
branches are a product of the probabilities of processes that 
make up the branch. For example, on a trial with a Black 
prime and low threat target, a (incorrect) “more threaten-
ing” response may result from stereotype activation and 
stereotype application (SAC × SAP). Alternatively, the 
same “more threatening” response could also result from a 
guessing bias when the stereotype is not active and the tar-
get threat is not correctly detected ([1 − SAC] × [1 − D] × 
G). As such, when a trial has a Black prime and a low threat 
target, the probability of a high threat judgment is ([SAC × 
SAP] + [1 − SAC] × [1 − D] × G).
All of the parameters are estimated using an expectation 
minimization algorithm to arrive at a maximum likelihood 
solution, in which the model expectations best approximate 
observed data. We estimated all models using the freely 
available computer program MultiTree (Moshagen, 2010). 
The degree to which there is a discrepancy between model 
expectations and observed data is reflected in the G2 good-
ness of fit test. When the model’s expectations closely 
approximate the observed data, it is reflected in small G2 and 
high p values. The same goodness of fit tests assess whether 
parameter estimates are statistically different across manipu-
lations. Here, large G2 and low p values indicate that param-
eters significantly differ from each other.
Multinomial modeling analyses. We aggregated “more threat-
ening” and “less threatening” responses for each SMT trial 
type, and fit the SMT model to the Safe, Accurate, and Quick 
intention conditions. The model fit appeared to be somewhat 
poor, G2(6) = 43.83, p < .001. However, G2 is sensitive to 
sample size (in this case, fit to N = 30,240 responses) and can 
detect even small misfit in large samples (Cressie, Pardo, & 
del Carmen Pardo, 2003). The Phi coefficient assesses the 
magnitude, or effect size, of model misfit. The resulting esti-
mate, φ = .038, indicated that the magnitude of misfit fell 
below Cohen’s (1992) criteria for a “small” effect (φ = .10) 
after controlling for statistical power.
To examine what processes could account for the effec-
tiveness of implementation intentions, we fit the SMT model 
to data from the three conditions: think “safe” versus “accu-
rate” versus “quick.” We first fit a baseline model that 
allowed all parameters to vary freely. Then, to test for differ-
ences between conditions in parameter estimates, we con-
strained each parameter one at a time across conditions. A 
significant reduction in model fit from the baseline model 
suggests that the parameter estimates differ reliably across 
intention conditions.
First, we investigated whether the SAC parameter dif-
fered across intention conditions.7 Safe intentions reduced 
stereotype activation compared to Accurate intentions, 
ΔG2(1) = 64.56, p < .001, w = .05 (see Table 2 for model 
estimates), and compared to Quick intentions, ΔG2 = 101.00, 
p < .001, w = .06. This indicates that the “think safe” inten-
tions reduced stereotype activation relative to both control 
conditions. Likewise, “think safe” intentions reduced stereo-
type application relative to both the “think accurate” control, 
ΔG2(1) = 252.92, p < .001, w = .09, and the “think quick” 
control, ΔG2 (1) = 445.57, p < .001, w = .12. There were no 
differences between conditions on the D parameter8 (all ps > 
.686). There was a greater rate of guessing “more threaten-
ing” in the Safe condition than the Accurate, ΔG2(1) = 48.46, 
p < .001, w = .04, and Quick conditions, ΔG2(1) = 53.27, p < 
.001, w = .04. Such a guessing bias cannot account for the 
effects of implementation intentions on the SMT effect, as 
increased threat judgments in the Safe condition would not 
reduce the extent of racial bias.9
Discussion
Replicating prior research using implementation intentions, 
safe implementation intentions significantly reduced stereo-
typing, as measured by the SMT. Specifically, safe intentions 
decreased the proportion of threat judgments given to targets 
following Black primes relative to White primes. This effect 
coincided with reductions to both stereotype activation and 
application. Implementation intentions did not appear to 
have any effect on detection, suggesting that these particular 
implementation intentions do not affect the ability to detect 
target threat level.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that forming implemen-
tation intentions to “think safe” in response to Black faces 
reduced stereotyping on the SMT, the extent of stereotype 
activation, and the extent of stereotype application. Given 
that these effects occurred within the context of an implicit 
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measure of bias, implementation intentions are certainly rela-
tively efficient. In addition, implementation intentions 
impacted judgments despite participants being explicitly 
asked to not be influenced by the prime stimuli, suggesting 
that the implementation intentions were effective even when 
participants intended to avoid the influence of the primes. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that using implementation inten-
tions does require a modicum of cognitive resources. In the 
remainder of our experiments, we directly investigate the 
extent to which implementation intentions rely on cognitive 
resources to reduce implicit bias. To our knowledge, no prior 
research has investigated how cognitive resource restrictions 
influence the effectiveness of implicit bias interventions. 
Establishing whether implementation intentions can effi-
ciently reduce bias in an intergroup context is important, as 
prior research has noted that stereotyping is more likely when 
individuals have limited cognitive resources (Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991). Furthermore, previous work has found that 
interacting with outgroup members can be cognitively load-
ing (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). While examining the effi-
ciency of implementation intentions for reducing implicit 
bias, we also examine how these conditions affect the specific 
processes through which implementation intentions may 
reduce bias, namely, stereotype activation and application. In 
Experiment 2, we investigate the role of cognitive resources 
via the use of a dual-task demand to vary cognitive load.
Method
Participants. In Experiment 2, we planned to collect at least 
82 participants to be powered at 95%, based on the effect 
size of η
p
2 = .09 reported in Stewart and Payne (2008). In 
total, 117 participants from the University of California, 
Davis completed the experiment for partial course credit. 
Two participants made the same judgment on every trial, and 
an additional five participants failed to correctly report their 
condition assignment. The final sample size was 110 (“safe” 
N = 58, “quick” N = 52).
Stimuli, procedure, and design. Prime and target stimuli were 
identical to the stimuli used in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 
introduced a factor of cognitive load via a digit-span 
manipulation. On one block of SMT trials, participants were 
asked to keep a nine-digit number in memory (high load), 
whereas on the other block, participants were asked to keep 
a two-digit number in memory (low load). Because the Accu-
rate and Quick conditions did not differ in Experiment 1, we 
dropped the Accurate condition in the experiments that fol-
lowed (also see Stewart & Payne, 2008).
This resulted in a 2 (Implementation Intention: Quick vs. 
Safe) × 2 (Cognitive Load: High vs. Low) × 2 (Load order: 
High to Low vs. Low to High) × 3 (Prime: Black vs. Neutral 
vs. White) × 2 (Target Threat: High vs. Low) mixed design. 
Implementation intentions and load order were manipulated 
between-subjects, and all other factors were within-subjects. 
Load order was counterbalanced. The order of cognitive load 
had no effect on the comparisons of interest and, as such, will 
not be mentioned further.
Results
SMT effect. To examine the effects of cognitive load on 
implementation intentions, we subjected the proportion of 
“more threatening” judgments to a 2 (Intention: Quick vs. 
Safe) × 2 (Cognitive Load: Low vs. High) × 3 (Prime: 
Black vs. Neutral vs. White) × 2 (Target Threat: High vs. 
Low) mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of Target, 
F(1, 108) = 35.52, p < .001, η
p
2 = .25, such that high threat 
targets received a greater proportion of threat judgments 
than low threat targets (see Table 3). There also was a prime 
main effect, F(2.34, 205.76) = 3.34, p = .030, η
p
2 = .03. 
Simple comparisons indicated that targets following White 
primes received a greater proportion of threat judgments 
than targets following Neutral primes, F(1, 109) = 9.16, 
p = .003, ηp2 = .08. There was no difference in the propor-
tion of threat judgments following Black primes relative to 
White (p = .098) or Neutral (p = .594) primes. Finally, there 
was a main effect of intention, F(1, 108) = 6.52, p = .012, 
η
p
2 = .06, such that a greater proportion of threat judgments 
were given in the Quick than in the Safe condition.
If cognitive load reduces the effectiveness of implementa-
tion intentions, we would expect an interaction among load, 
implementation intentions, and prime. However, such an 
interaction with load was not observed, suggesting that cogni-
tive resource restrictions had no detectable impact on the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions, F(1.91, 206.16) 
= 2.07, p = .131, η
p
2 = .02. The results replicated the interac-
tion between intention and prime observed in Experiment 1, 
F(1.91, 205.76) = 14.92, p < .001, η
p
2 = .12 (see Figure 4). 
To better understand this interaction, we examined the prime 
effect within both the Quick and Safe conditions. Within the 
Quick condition, there was a main effect of prime, F(2, 102) 
= 6.79, p = .002, η
p
2 = .12. Simple comparisons showed that 
the proportion of threat judgments was higher following 
Black primes than White primes, F(1, 51) = 5.00, p = .030, 
η
p
2 = .09, 95% CIdiff [.01, .20], and Neutral primes, F(1, 51) 
= 12.19, p = .001, η
p
2 = .19, 95% CIdiff [.07, .26].
Table 2. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% Confidence 
Intervals] by Implementation Intention Condition.
Experiment 1
 Accurate Quick Safe
SAC .55 [.49, .61] .63 [.58, .70] .22 [.17, .28]
SAP .62 [.59, .64] .61 [.59, .64] .00 [–.12, .12]
D .06 [.04, .09] .07 [.04, .09] .06 [.04, .08]
G .26 [.24, .27] .25 [.23, .27] .33 [.32, .34]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; SAC = stereotype activation; 
SAP = stereotype application; D = target detection; G = guessing.
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In the Safe condition, there also was a prime main effect, 
F(1.90, 105.62) = 11.60, p < .001, η
p
2 = .17. Simple compari-
sons revealed a lower proportion of threat judgments follow-
ing Black primes than White primes, F(1, 57) = 18.90, 
p < .001, η
p
2 = .25, 95% CIdiff [−.31, −.12], and Neutral 
primes, F(1, 57) = 5.57, p = .022, η
p
2 = .09, 95% CIdiff 
[−.20, −.02]. Once again, the Safe instructions resulted in a 
reversal of the standard SMT stereotyping effect. In addition, 
a greater proportion of threat judgments were given 
following White primes than Neutral primes, F(1, 57) = 
8.16, p = .006, η
p
2 = .13, 95% CIdiff [.03, .18].
Multinomial modeling analyses. We fit the SMT model to the 
Safe and Quick intention conditions. As in Experiment 1, 
there was a detectable discrepancy between model predictions 
and the observed data. However, after controlling for power, 
the magnitude of misfit was small, G2 = 57.19, p < .001, 
φ = .043. Replicating Experiment 1, SAC was reduced in the 
Safe relative to the Quick condition, ΔG2 = 111.47, p < .001, 
w = .06 (see Table 4 for parameter estimates). Likewise, SAP 
was reduced when participants formed intentions to think 
Safe versus Quick, ΔG2 = 309.94, p < .001, w = .10.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in finding that Safe 
implementation intentions reduced stereotyping relative to 
Quick intentions. As in Experiment 1, this effect was associated 
with reductions in both stereotype activation and stereotype 
application. Cognitive load had no detectable effect on the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions in reducing SMT 
stereotyping, stereotype activation, or stereotype application.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 found that the effectiveness of implementation 
intentions to “think safe” in reducing stereotyping was not 
affected by the availability of cognitive resources. In addi-
tion, Experiment 2 provided further evidence that implemen-
tation intentions reduce both stereotype activation and 
stereotype application.
In Experiment 3, we sought to test whether implementa-
tion intentions would prove effective at stereotype reduction 
when cognitive resources were constrained by the time par-
ticipants were given to respond. Likewise, we sought to 
determine whether implementation intentions would con-
tinue to reduce both stereotype activation and stereotype 
application when time was limited.
Table 3. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Implementation Intention, Cognitive Load, Prime, and 
Target.
Experiment 2
 Low load High load
 Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
Quick
 High threat .49 (.04) .36 (.04) .38 (.04) .50 (.03) .38 (.04) .41 (.04)
 Low threat .45 (.03) .25 (.04) .35 (.04) .48 (.03) .28 (.04) .35 (.04)
Safe
 High threat .23 (.03) .33 (.04) .43 (.03) .21 (.03) .40 (.04) .46 (.03)
 Low threat .21 (.03) .25 (.04) .40 (.04) .19 (.03) .29 (.04) .41 (.03)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in column.
Figure 4. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
implementation intention and prime in Experiment 2.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Table 4. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% Confidence 
Intervals] by Implementation Intention.
Experiment 2
 Quick Safe
SAC .62 [.56, .67] .21 [.56, .60]
SAP .58 [.56, .60] .00 [.09, .09]
D .10 [.07, .12] .06 [.05, .08]
G .29 [.28, .31] .27 [.26, .29]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; SAC = stereotype activation; 
SAP = stereotype application; D = target detection; G = guessing.
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Method
Participants. In Experiment 3, we planned to sample from at 
least 192 participants to be powered at 80%, based on the 
effect size, Cohen’s f = .29, found in Experiment 1. In total, 
201 participants from the University of California, Davis 
completed the experiment for partial course credit. Four par-
ticipants made the same judgment on every trial, one partici-
pant was identified as an outlier according to our preregistered 
plan, and an additional 20 participants failed to accurately 
report their condition assignment. The final sample size was 
175 participants (“safe” N = 93, “quick” N = 85).
Stimuli, procedure, and design. The prime and target stimuli 
were identical to the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Experiment 3 introduced a between-subjects manipulation of 
response window. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either a version of the SMT in which they were required to 
respond within 450 ms (short) or a version in which they 
were required to respond within 850 ms (long). Our selection 
of response windows was determined by the approximate 
time participants usually take to respond on the SMT (Stud-
ies 1 and 2 M
RT
 = 594.53) and corresponds to common con-
ventions for speeded and nonspeeded responding in 
sequential priming paradigms, such as the weapon identifica-
tion task (e.g., Payne, 2001). This resulted in a 2 (Implemen-
tation Intention: Safe vs. Quick) × 2 (Response Window: 
Short vs. Long) × 3 (Prime: Black vs. Neutral vs. White) × 2 
(Target Threat: High vs. Low) mixed design, in which imple-
mentation intentions and response window were between-
subjects, and all other factors were within-subjects.
Results
SMT effect. To examine whether response window moder-
ated the effect of implementation intentions, we subjected 
the proportion of “more threatening” judgments to a 2 (Inten-
tion: Quick vs. Safe) × 2 (Response Window: Short vs. Long) 
× 3 (Prime: Black vs. Neutral vs. White) × 2 (Target Threat: 
High vs. Low) mixed ANOVA. There was a Target main 
effect, F(1, 174) = 4.60, p = .033, η
p
2 = .03, indicating that 
high threat targets received a greater proportion of threat 
judgments than low threat targets (see Table 5). There also 
was a main effect of intention, F(1, 174) = 7.96, p = .005, 
η
p
2 = .04, such that there was a greater proportion of threat 
responses given in the Quick than in the Safe condition.
Replicating the prior two experiments, there was an 
Intention × Prime interaction, F(2, 348) = 37.00, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .18. However, this effect was qualified by a three-way 
interaction among intention, response window, and prime, 
F(2, 348) = 5.76, p = .003, η
p
2 = .03 (see Figure 5). To better 
understand this interaction, we conducted two separate 
Intention × Prime ANOVAs on the proportion of “more 
threatening” judgments, one for each level of the response 
window manipulation.
In the Long Window condition, there was an Intention 
× Prime interaction, F(2, 178) = 29.94, p < .001, η
p
2 = .25. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the Quick condition showed a 
Table 5. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Response Window, Implementation Intention, Prime, 
and Target.
Experiment 3
 Quick Safe
 Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
Long window
 High threat .49 (.03) .30 (.04) .31 (.03) .21 (.03) .37 (.04) .41 (.03)
 Low threat .47 (.03) .23 (.04) .31 (.03) .19 (.03) .33 (.04) .43 (.03)
Short window
 High threat .47 (.03) .37 (.04) .40 (.03) .27 (.03) .33 (.04) .32 (.03)
 Low threat .49 (.03) .38 (.04) .37 (.03) .25 (.03) .31 (.04) .33 (.03)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in column.
Figure 5. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
response window, implementation intention, and prime in 
Experiment 3.
Note. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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standard prime main effect, F(2, 84) = 17.00, p < .001, η
p
2 = .29. 
Simple comparisons showed that the proportion of threat 
judgments was greater following Black primes than White 
primes, F(1, 42) = 13.79, p = .001, η
p
2 = .25, 95% CIdiff [.08, 
.26], and Neutral primes, F(1, 42) = 30.01, p < .001, η
p
2 = .42, 
95% CIdiff [.13, .29]. Once again, the Safe condition showed 
a reversed prime effect, F(2, 94) = 15.52, p < .001, η
p
2 = .25, 
with a lower proportion of threat judgments following Black 
primes than White primes, F(1, 47) = 29.60, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .39, 95% CIdiff [−.31, −.14], and Neutral primes 
F(1, 47) = 12.32, p = .001, η
p
2 = .21, 95% CIdiff [−.24, −.06].
In the Short Window condition, there also was an Intention 
× Prime interaction, F(2, 170) = 8.73, p < .001, η
p
2 = .09. The 
Quick condition showed a standard prime effect, F(2, 82) = 7.31, 
p = .001, η
p
2 = .15. Simple comparisons showed that a greater 
proportion of threat judgments were made following Black 
primes than White primes, F(1, 41) = 9.71, p = .003, 
η
p
2 = .19, 95% CIdiff [.04, .16], and Neutral primes, F(1, 41) 
= 9.00, p = .005, η
p
2 = .18, 95% CIdiff [.03, .17]. In the Safe 
condition, there was a trend toward a reversed prime effect, 
F(2, 88) = 2.49, p = .088, η
p
2 = .05. Simple comparisons 
showed that the proportion of threat judgments was lower 
following Black primes than White primes, F(1, 44) = 4.01, 
p = .051, η
p
2 = .08, 95% CIdiff [−.14, .00], but not Neutral 
primes, F(1, 44) = 2.74, p = .105. Thus, we observed the 
same interaction between prime and intention as in the previ-
ous studies, although the interaction was weaker when the 
response window was shorter.
Multinomial modeling analyses. The extent of model misfit 
was small in magnitude after controlling for power, G2(8) = 
67.19, p < .001, φ = .051. To examine the interaction between 
response window and implementation intentions, we esti-
mated a model that permitted an interaction between inten-
tions and response window, and compared its fit with a model 
that did not permit the interaction. Analyses revealed an 
interaction between intention and response window on the 
SAC parameter, ΔG2(1) = 6.99, p = .008, w = .02. Forming 
intentions to “think safe” reduced SAC at both Short and 
Long windows. However, the reduction in SAC was larger in 
the Long condition, ΔG2(1) = 51.72, p < .001, w = .04, than 
in the Short condition, ΔG2(1) = 14.33, p < .001, w = .02 (see 
Table 6). Replicating prior experiments, forming intentions 
to “think safe” reduced SAP, ΔG2(1) = 254.88, p < .001, 
w = .10. This effect was not moderated by response window, 
G2(1) < .001, p > .999, w < .001.
Discussion
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, forming intentions to 
“think safe” reduced racial stereotyping on the SMT. 
Likewise, implementation intentions reduced both stereotype 
activation and stereotype application. Unlike in Experiment 
2, we found that restricting cognitive resources by restricting 
the time participants had to reach their judgments moderated 
the effectiveness of implementation intentions. Specifically, 
implementation intentions were less effective in reducing ste-
reotyping when the response window was short compared to 
when the response window was longer. However, implemen-
tation intentions were still effective in reducing implicit ste-
reotyping, even when participants had to respond within the 
short response window. Likewise, the reduction in stereotype 
activation due to safe intentions was present under both 
response windows but reduced in the short window. These 
findings suggest that intentions operate efficiently, but not 
without limit; their effectiveness may be reduced when peo-
ple must rapidly make judgments. The extent to which safe 
intentions reduced stereotype application was not affected by 
response window.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we sought to replicate and extend our previ-
ous results by testing stereotyping of a different social cate-
gory: gender. Rather than using primes that varied in race, 
we used male and female primes. In doing so, we can gain 
further insight into the conditions under which implementa-
tion intentions are effective. Much research has observed 
that participants from college undergraduate samples have 
become increasingly hesitant to endorse racial stereotyping 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & 
Krysan, 1997). In some cases, students hold strong egalitarian 
goals that allow them to regulate their bias, even on implicit 
measures (Moskowitz & Li, 2011). As such, we assume that 
Table 6. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% Confidence Intervals] by Implementation Intention.
Experiment 3
Long Short
Quick Safe Quick Safe
SAC .55 [.48, .62] .21 [.16, .25] .43 [.27, .60] .06 [.02, .10]
SAP .66 [.62, .69] .00 [–.12, .11] .61 [.56, .67] .00 [–.37, .37]
D .05 [.02, .09] .03 [.01, .06] .00 [–.03, .03] .01 [–.01, .03]
G .25 [.23, .27] .29 [.28, .31] .38 [.36, .40] .29 [.28, .30]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target detection; G = guessing.
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many of our participants possess a goal to avoid using racial 
stereotypes and have some practice with doing so. In con-
trast, although men are generally stereotyped as more aggres-
sive and threatening than women (Swim, 1994; Weaver, 
Vandello, Bosson, & Burnaford, 2010), it does not seem that 
people spontaneously correct for a bias to judge men as more 
threatening than women. As such, we expected our partici-
pants to have less practice with and less motivation to avoid 
judging men as more threatening than women. Thus, investi-
gating gender rather than race allows us to determine whether 
implementation intentions can reduce stereotyping even 
when participants have little practice with and motivation to 
correct for the stereotype. Furthermore, in manipulating 
response window, we can once again test the extent to which 
intentions operate efficiently, but now for a goal that partici-
pants are unlikely to hold intrinsically and for which they are 
unlikely to be practiced.
Participants
In Experiment 4, we planned to sample from at least 192 
participants to be powered at 80%, based on the effect size, 
Cohen’s f = .29, found in Experiment 1. In total, 231 partici-
pants from the University of California, Davis completed the 
experiment for partial course credit. A computer error 
resulted in the loss of data from 10 participants, and another 
29 failed to accurately report their condition assignment. The 
final sample size was 228 participants (“safe” N = 114, 
“quick” N = 114).
Stimuli, Procedure, and Design
Prime stimuli were photographs of 24 men and women taken 
from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 
2015) that were cropped at the neck. We also continued to use 
the same neutral prime image from the prior experiments. All 
prime stimuli were superimposed on a gray background. 
Target stimuli were the same as used in prior experiments. 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3. This resulted in 
a 2 (Implementation Intention: Safe vs. Quick) × 2 (Response 
Window: Short vs. Long) × 3 (Prime: Male vs. Neutral vs. 
Female) × 2 (Target Threat: High vs. Low) mixed design, in 
which intentions and response window were between-sub-
jects, and other factors were within-subjects.
Results
SMT effects. We conducted an Implementation intention × 
Response window × Prime × Target mixed ANOVA on the 
proportion of “more threatening” judgments. There was a 
main effect of prime type, F(1.92, 373.84) = 21.63, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .10. Simple comparisons showed that a greater propor-
tion of threat judgments were given following Male primes 
than Female primes, F(1, 198) = 30.00, p < .001, η
p
2 = .13, 
and Neutral primes F(1, 198) = 34.80, p < .001, η
p
2 = .15 (see 
Table 7). There also was a main effect of intention, F(1, 195) 
= 25.43, p < .001, η
p
2 = .12, showing that a greater propor-
tion of threat judgments were given in the Quick than the 
Safe condition. However, these main effects were qualified 
by the expected Intention × Prime interaction, F(2, 390) = 
31.29, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14 (see Figure 6). Response window 
Table 7. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Implementation Intention, Response Window, Prime, 
and Target.
Experiment 4
Safe Quick
Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
Long window
 High threat .33 (.03) .26 (.04) .31 (.03) .60 (.03) .42 (.04) .24 (.03)
 Low threat .32 (.03) .23 (.04) .31 (.03) .58 (.03) .41 (.03) .26 (.03)
Short window
 High threat .28 (.03) .26 (.04) .36 (.03) .51 (.03) .41 (.04) .32 (.03)
 Low threat .30 (.03) .26 (.04) .25 (.03) .50 (.03) .40 (.03) .31 (.03)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in column.
Figure 6. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
implementation intention and prime in Experiment 4.
Note. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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did not moderate the effectiveness of implementation inten-
tions, F(2, 390) = 0.42, p = .660.
To understand the Intention × Prime interaction, we 
conducted two different ANOVAs examining the prime 
effect for each intention condition. In the Quick condition, 
there was a prime main effect, F(2, 208) = 59.95, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .37. Simple comparisons showed that there was a 
greater proportion of threat judgments following Male primes 
than Female primes, F(1, 104) = 116.28, p < .001, η
p
2 = .53, 
95% CIdiff [.22, .31], and Neutral primes, F(1, 104) = 31.75, 
p < .001, η
p
2 = .23, 95% CIdiff [.09, .18]. There also was a 
lower proportion of threat judgments following Female 
primes than Neutral primes, F(1, 104) = 29.13, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .22, 95% CIdiff [−.18, −.08].
In the Safe condition, there was a reliable but weaker 
prime effect, F(1.65, 153.10) = 3.85, p = .031, η
p
2 = .04. 
Simple comparisons showed that the proportion of threat 
judgments did not reliably differ following Male and Female 
primes, F(1, 93) = .61, p = .435, but that there was a higher 
proportion of threat judgments following Male primes than 
Neutral primes, F(1, 93) = 6.41, p = .013, η
p
2 = .06, 95% 
CIdiff [.01, .10]. In addition, the proportion of threat judg-
ments was significantly higher after Female primes than 
Neutral primes, F(1, 93) = 6.24, p = .014, η
p
2 = .06, 95% 
CIdiff [.02, .15].
Multinomial modeling analyses. We fit the SMT model to the 
two intention conditions. Model misfit was small after control-
ling for statistical power, G2(4) = 10.01, p = .040, φ = .019. 
Unlike Experiments 1 to 3, there was no effect of implementa-
tion intention on SAC, ΔG2(1) = .26, p = .609 (see Table 8). 
However, intentions to think Safe reduced SAP compared with 
intentions to think Quick, ΔG2(1) = 77.25, p < .001, w = .05.
Discussion
Experiment 4 largely replicated the previous experiments in 
showing that implementation intentions reduced implicit ste-
reotyping. This effect was not moderated by response win-
dow. Although stereotyping was observed in the “think safe” 
condition, it was significantly reduced, extending the results 
of Experiments 1 to 3 in showing that implementation inten-
tions are effective even for stereotypes that participants are 
unlikely to regularly inhibit. With regard to the processes 
underlying these effects, our findings were more mixed: 
Implementation intentions reduced the application of gen-
der-based stereotypes but did not influence the activation of 
gender-based stereotypes.
General Discussion
The current research had two goals: to examine the processes 
by which implementation intentions reduce implicit bias and 
to test the extent to which implementation intentions reduce 
such bias efficiently. With respect to the first goal, results 
show that, in most cases (Experiments 1 to 3), implementa-
tion intentions to “think safe” reduce both stereotype activa-
tion (i.e., the extent to which stereotypic information comes 
to mind) and stereotype application (i.e., the extent to which 
stereotypes are applied in judgment). Interestingly, for gen-
der-based stereotypes, a domain in which people have less 
practice and less motivation to avoid bias, implementation 
intentions only impacted the stereotype application process. 
With respect to the second goal, we found that the effect of 
implementation intentions on reducing implicit stereotyping 
was generally not diminished by constraints on cognitive 
resources (Experiments 2 to 4). In Experiment 3, short 
response windows did reduce the effectiveness of safe inten-
tions. Nevertheless, at both response windows, safe inten-
tions effectively eliminated typical racial biases. The 
cognitive processes affected by implementation intentions 
also were largely unaffected by resource restrictions. That is, 
intentions to “think safe” reduced both stereotype activation 
and application, regardless of cognitive resources.
Experiments 1 to 3 showed a consistent effect of safe 
intentions reducing race-based stereotype activation and 
application. In contrast, in Experiment 4, intentions to “think 
safe” influenced the likelihood of applying gender stereo-
types but not the likelihood of activating gender stereotypes. 
There are a number of possible reasons why gender and race 
stereotyping may differ in terms of stereotype activation and 
why stereotyping interventions may operate differently with 
respect to the two groups. First, participants may be less 
intrinsically motivated (and, therefore, less practiced) to cor-
rect for the stereotype of males as threatening than they are 
to correct for the stereotype of Black people as threatening 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Moskowitz & Li, 2011; Schuman 
et al., 1997), which could diminish people’s capacity to 
down-regulate stereotype activation. Moreover, gender is 
often seen as a more essentialized category than race 
(Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & Taylor, 
2000; Taylor, 1996), and gender categories are preferentially 
used (vs. race categories) when the two compete (e.g., 
Klauer, Hölzenbein, Calanchini, & Sherman, 2014). Finally, 
it also is possible that participants may simply have stronger 
mental associations of males (vs. females) with threat than of 
Table 8. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% Confidence 
Intervals] by Implementation Intention.
Experiment 4
 Quick Safe
SAC .26 [.42, .49] .28 [.22, .33]
SAP 1.00 [.85, .1.15] .45 [.42, .49]
D .01 [–.01, .03] .01 [–.01, .03]
G .40 [.38, .41] .25 [.24, .26]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; CI = confidence interval; 
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target 
detection; G = guessing.
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Black males (vs. White males) with threat, which could also 
diminish the capacity for the down-regulation of stereotype 
activity. Regardless of the reasons why implementation 
intentions affected stereotype application but not activation 
of gender stereotypes, it is notable that they did successfully 
decrease gender stereotyping.
Implementation intentions did not have a consistent effect 
on target detection. Such findings have important implica-
tions for the use of implementation intentions as a bias-
reduction strategy. Specifically, although implementation 
intentions caused people to behave in a less racially biased 
way, they were not necessarily more accurate in their detec-
tion of target threat. In addition, in the behavioral data, we 
observed reduced bias via a reversal pattern in threat judg-
ments: Targets following White faces received a greater pro-
portion of threat judgments than targets following Black 
faces. Although this is a clear reduction in Black-threat bias, 
such bias reduction does not appear to improve accuracy. 
Thus, implementation intentions are effective at decreasing 
racial bias but may not be an appropriate strategy for increas-
ing accuracy in person perception. These findings emphasize 
the importance of better understanding how interventions 
influence cognitive processes and exert their effects before 
such strategies are applied outside of the lab.
Our second major finding was that implementation inten-
tions were highly resistant to the restriction of cognitive 
resources. Intentions were effective under cognitive load, even 
when the intentions were formed to reduce bias toward a group 
that individuals likely had little intrinsic motivation to avoid 
stereotyping. These findings suggest that implementation 
intentions are highly efficient and reduce bias even when it is 
more difficult to keep the intentions in mind. Very little research 
has been conducted exploring whether bias interventions will 
be effective in conditions that restrict cognitive resources. For 
example, previous research found that intergroup interactions 
can be stressful, and tax executive functioning (Richeson & 
Shelton, 2003). Determining whether bias interventions work 
in nonideal situations, such as when cognitive resources are 
limited, is important for the application of such interventions. 
Future research should further test the conditions in which a 
variety of bias interventions can successfully operate.
Although we find consistent effects of implementation 
intentions for a reduction in implicit threat bias, it is unknown 
how this might map on to more complex situations outside of 
the lab. The current work focuses on the effect that imple-
mentation intentions have on mental processes that occur 
relatively early in person perception, wherein participants 
are often making their judgments in less than a second. It 
seems potentially promising that implementation intentions 
influence judgments even in cognitively taxing situations, 
which may more closely capture the state of perceivers in an 
intergroup context. In particular, interracial interaction con-
texts are often associated with decreased executive function 
for White perceivers, suggesting that intergroup interaction 
is a cognitively demanding experience (Richeson & Shelton, 
2003). Overall, our findings likely best predict impressions 
and behavioral outcomes in contexts in which judgments are 
made quickly. It is possible that in lengthier intergroup inter-
actions, such implementation intentions could have different 
effects on judgments and behavior.
Conclusion
Our research replicates and extends prior work testing the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions in reducing 
implicit bias (Lai et al., 2014). Furthering our understanding 
of implementation intentions, we found that safe implemen-
tation intentions reduce both stereotype activation and appli-
cation but do not impact detection. These are the first data 
that directly examine the specific cognitive processes 
affected by implementation intentions. That stereotype acti-
vation was reduced may suggest that implementation inten-
tions can temporarily change what information becomes 
accessible when Black faces are presented. It is not simply 
the case that implementation intentions affect only the appli-
cation of stereotypic information that is already activated. 
The effects of implementation intentions on stereotype 
reduction processes are highly efficient and appear to not 
require prior practice inhibiting the stereotype in question. It 
will be important for future research to test whether other 
interventions that reduce implicit stereotyping operate simi-
larly, specifically, whether they similarly reduce both stereo-
type activation and application processes or whether they 
alter different combinations of processes, including individ-
uation. Our findings suggest that implementation intentions 
should be employed when bias reduction is the goal but not 
when increased judgment accuracy is the desired outcome. 
In addition, it is important to examine how well implicit ste-
reotyping interventions work in cognitively restricted condi-
tions and how motivation influences their effectiveness. A 
broader knowledge of the conditions under which stereotyp-
ing interventions operate, and of which processes they 
impact, can help us understand when and how different inter-
ventions may work most effectively.
Appendix
Additional SMT Effect Results
Experiment 1: Prime × Target Interaction.10 There was an unpre-
dicted Prime × Target interaction, F(2, 207) = 12.08, 
p < .001, η
p
2 = .06. To better understand this interaction, we 
examined the target effect for each prime type. These analyses 
revealed a target effect on trials when Black primes were 
presented, F(1, 209) = 12.35, p = .001, η
p
2 = .06, and when 
Neutral primes were presented, F(1, 209) = 41.56, p < .001, 
η
p
2 = .17, but not when White primes were presented, F(1, 
209) = 2.76, p = .098. These results suggest that participants 
differentiated between target threat levels to a greater extent 
following Black and Neutral primes (e.g., giving a greater 
proportion of threat judgments to high threat targets relative 
to low threat targets) than they did following White primes.
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Experiment 2: additional analyses. There was a Prime × Target 
interaction, F(1.90, 201.10) = 17.58, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14. To 
better understand this interaction, we examined the Target 
effect for each prime type. There were Target effects for all 
prime types: Black, F(1, 109) = 4.40, p = .038, η
p
2 = .04; 
Neutral, F(1, 109) = 49.34, p < .001, η
p
2 = .31; and White, 
F(1, 109) = 14.90, p < .001, η
p
2 = .12. In every case, high 
threat targets were given a greater proportion of threat judg-
ments than low threat targets. However, the target effect was 
strongest on Neutral prime trials.
Experiment 3: Window × Prime × Target interaction. There was 
a Window × Prime × Target interaction, F(2, 174) = 3.28, 
p = .040, η
p
2 = .02. To better understand this interaction, we 
conducted separate Prime × Target ANOVAs for each Win-
dow condition. Within the Long window, there was a Prime 
× Target interaction, F(2, 178) = 6.25, p = .002, η
p
2 = .07, but 
not in the Short window condition, F(2, 170) = .04, p = .963. 
At Long windows, there was a target effect for Neutral 
primes only, F(1, 90) = 15.00, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14, in which 
high threat targets received a greater proportion of threat 
responses than low threat targets.
Experiment 4: Window × Prime interaction. There was a Response 
window × Prime interaction, F(2, 390) = 4.42, p = .013, 
η
p
2 = .02. To decompose the interaction, we conducted two 
separate within-subjects ANOVAs for each Window condi-
tion. In the Long window condition there was a prime main 
effect, F(2.00, 188.00) = 16.45, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14. Simple 
comparisons indicated that targets following Male primes 
were given a greater proportion of threat responses than 
Female, F(1, 100) = 26.44, p < .001, η
p
2 = .21, or Neutral 
primes F(1, 100) = 21.00, p < .001, η
p
2 = .17. In the Short 
window condition, there was also a prime main effect, 
F(1.63, 158.00) = 5.45, p = .009, η
p
2 = .05. Simple compari-
sons indicated that targets following Male primes were given 
a greater proportion of threat responses than Female, 
F(1, 97) = 6.00, p = .017, η
p
2 = .06, or Neutral primes F(1, 97) 
= 16.00, p < .001, η
p
2 = .14. Although there was a prime main 
effect at both windows, it appeared that the prime effect was 
stronger in the Long response window condition than Short.
Detection and Guessing Results by Experiment
Experiment 2. There was a significant difference between the 
Safe and Quick conditions on the G parameter, ΔG2 = 4.60, 
p = .032, w = .01, indicating that participants in the Quick 
condition had a tendency to guess “more threat” on a greater 
proportion of trials than participants in the Safe condition. 
The D parameter was also higher in the Quick condition than 
the Safe condition, ΔG2 = 5.65, p = .020, w = .01.
Experiment 3. There was an interaction between intention and 
response window on the G parameter, ΔG2(1) = 45.16, p < .001, 
w = .04. In the Long window condition, participants in the Safe 
condition guessed “more threatening” on a greater proportion 
of trials than in the Quick condition, ΔG2(1) = 8.66, p = .003, 
w = .02. These effects were reversed in the Short Window con-
dition: Participants in the Quick condition guessed “more 
threatening” on a greater proportion of trials than in the Safe 
condition, ΔG2(1) = 47.87, p < .001, w = .04. Our guessing 
findings once again differ from the prior two experiments, 
making it difficult to interpret the effect of implementation 
intentions on guessing. Response window did not interact with 
the effect of intention on detection. However, there was an 
unsurprising effect of response window on the D parameter 
ΔG2(1) = 5.56, p = .018, w = .01, indicating that detection was 
higher in the long than short window condition.
Experiment 4. There was an effect of intentions on the G 
parameter, ΔG2(1) = 254.96, p < .001, w = .09, indicating that 
participants in the Quick condition guessed “more threaten-
ing” on a greater proportion of trials than in the Safe condi-
tion. These findings were consistent with Experiment 2. 
However, given the lack of consistency in effects on the G 
parameter, we hesitate to interpret such results. In this exper-
iment, there was no effect of either intentions or response 
window on the D parameter.
AIC/BIC/MDL Information Criteria by Experiment and Multinomial Model.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
 AIC BIC MDL AIC BIC MDL AIC BIC MDL AIC BIC MDL
SMT 39,632.7 39,666 19,829 40,645.6 40,679 20,335.6 33,364 33,396.7 16,694.4 36,756.9 36,790 18,391
d-SMT 39,649.4 39,682.7 19,836.9 40,664.5 40,698 20,344.5 33,364.7 33,397.4 16,694.3 36,757.1 33,397.4 18,390.6
AMP 39,626.4 39,668 19,828.9 40,650.7 40,692.5 20,341.1 33,363 33,403.9 16,696.8 36,759 36,800.3 18,395
C-PDP 46,317.7 46,334.3 23,166.4 47,626.4 47,643.1 23,820.8 39,320.8 39,337.2 19,667.9 42,615.2 42,631.7 21,315.1
C-PDPg 39,835.7 39,860.7 19,928.1 40,836.8 40,861.9 20,428.7 36,760.9 36,785.7 16,702.1 36,760.9 36,785.7 18,390.6
A-PDP 42,360.9 42,377.5 21,188.1 43,729.6 43,746.4 21,872.5 36,132.1 36,148.4 18,073.6 39,209.6 39,266.1 19,612.4
A-PDPg 39,835.7 39,860.7 19,928.2 40,836.8 40,861.9 20,428.8 33,384.2 33,408.7 16,702.2 36,761 36,785.8 18,390.7
Note. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion; MDL = minimum description length; Model acronyms; SMT = stereotype 
misperception; d-SMT = detection-first SMT; AMP = affect misattribution; C-PDP = control-dominant process dissociation; C-PDPg = control-dominant 
PDP with guessing parameter; A-PDP = automaticity-dominant process dissociation; A-PDPg = automaticity-dominant PDP with guessing parameter.
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Notes
 1. In this paper, we use the term implicit bias to refer to bias that 
is measured indirectly using implicit measures (Brannon & 
Gawronski, 2017). Implicit measures use task performance 
(e.g., error rates) to infer bias rather than self-reported beliefs. 
This definition does not make assumptions about the nature of 
underlying mental processes and representations, which must be 
investigated empirically.
 2. Although prior research using such implementation intentions 
for implicit bias reduction (Stewart & Payne, 2008) does not 
report removing participants for failing an attention check, we 
felt that it was sensible to remove participants who were unable 
to report what condition they were in, as this indicates that 
the intended processing goal was not effectively manipulated 
among these participants.
 3. As our criteria for removing these participants (subjective reports 
from research assistants) were not mentioned in the preregistra-
tion, we conducted our analyses with the two participants in the 
dataset and with them removed. We found that our statistical 
conclusions did not differ based on whether these participants 
were included. Statistics reported in the main text exclude these 
two cases, as we believe they offer the most informational value.
 4. We report all measures, conditions, data exclusions, and sample 
size determination criteria.
 5. Huynh–Feldt corrections applied for violations of sphericity.
 6. These effects were qualified by an unpredicted Prime × Target 
interaction, F(2, 207) = 12.08, p < .001, η
p
2 = .06. Because the 
prime by target interaction was unpredicted, not consistently 
observed across experiments, and irrelevant to the effect of 
implementation intentions, we fully describe this interaction in 
the appendix.
 7. As illustrated in Figure 3, the stereotype misperception task 
(SMT) model is fit to response patterns for each combination 
of prime and target. Because the factors of prime and target are 
necessarily already accounted for in the model, only compari-
sons between additional conditions are meaningful (in this case 
intention type)
 8. The D parameter can be conceptualized as the extent to which 
participants were accurate at detecting threat level on the 
SMT. In general, accuracy is quite low in the SMT, as tar-
get ambiguity is high. This is necessary to observe the effects 
of the primes. It is notable that the implementation intention 
manipulation to think “accurate” did not increase detection 
for participants. Similar results were observed by Stewart and 
Payne (2008). What is most important for this control con-
dition is that participants were thinking about being accu-
rate when they saw Black faces, whether that affected their 
responses or not.
 9. The effects of implementation intentions on D and G parameters 
were not consistent across experiments and were not of primary 
interest. As such, we report the D and G results for subsequent 
studies in the appendix.
10. The prime by target interaction trended toward violating the 
assumption of sphericity (p = .064); however, because this vio-
lation was marginal, and the correction had no substantive effect 
on the effects, we report uncorrected statistics.
Supplemental Material
Supplementary material is available online with this article.
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